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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, in [8], S. Park introduced a new concept of abstract convex space
and several classes of correspondences having the KKM property. With this
new concept, the KKM type correspondences were used to obtain coinci-
dence theorems, fixed point theorems and minimax inequalities. S. Park
generalizes and unifies most of important results in the KKM theory on
G-convex spaces, H-spaces, and convex spaces (for example, see [8]-[13]).
For the history of KKM literature, we must remind Ky Fan [3], who
extended the original KKM theorem to arbitrarily topological vector space.
The property of close-valuedness of related KKM correspondences was re-
placed with more general concepts. In [7], Luc and al. have introduced
the concept of intersectionally closed-valued correspondences and in [13],
S. Park has obtained new KKM type theorems for this kind of KKM corre-
spondences.
In this paper we use the minimax inequalities obtained by S. Park in
[13] to prove the existence of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto Nash
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Equilibria of a multiobjective game defined on abstract convex spaces. For
the history of minimax theorems, I also must remind the name of Ky Fan
(see [4]). Among the authors who studied the existence of Pareto equilibria
in game theory with vector payoffs, I emphasize S. Chebbi [2], W. K. Kim
[5], W. K. Kim, X. P. Ding [6], H. Yu [16], J. Yu, G. X.-Z Yuan [17], X.
Z. Yuan, E. Tarafdar [18]. A reference work is the paper of M. Zeleny [19].
The approaches of above-mentioned authors deal with the Ky Fan minimax
inequality, quasi-equilibrium theorems or quasi-variational inequalities. We
must mention the papers of P. Borm, F. Megen, S. Tijs [1], who introduced
the concept of perfectness for multicriteria games and M. Voorneveld, S.
Grahn, M. Dufwenberg [14], who studied the existence of ideal equilibria.
Ather authors, as H. Yu (see [16]), obtained the existence of a solution of
multiobjective games by using new concepts of continuity and convexity.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, some notation, termi-
nological convention, basic definitions and results about abstract convex
spaces and minimax inequalities are given. Section 3 introduces the model,
that is, a multiobjective game defined on an abstract convex space and the
concept of weight Nash equilibrium. Section 4 contains existence results for
weight Nash equilibrium and Pareto Nash equilibrium.
2 ABSTRACT CONVEX SPACES AND MINIMAX
INEQUALITIES
Let A be a subset of a topological space X . 2A denotes the family of all
subsets of A. A denotes the closure of A in X and intA denotes the interiorof
A. If A is a subset of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of A. If
F , G : X → 2Y are correspondences, then coG, cl G, G ∩ F : X → 2Y
are correspondences defined by (coG)(x) =coG(x), (clG)(x) =clG(x) and
(G ∩ F )(x) = G(x) ∩ F (x) for each x ∈ X , respectively. The graph of F :
X → 2Y is the set Gr(F ) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | y ∈ F (x)} and F− : Y → 2X
is defined by F−(y) = {x ∈ X : y ∈ F (x)} for y ∈ Y. Let F (A) be the set
of all nonempty finite subsets of a set A.
For the reader’s convenience, we review a few basic definitions and results
from abstract convex spaces.
Definition 1 [13]. Let X be a topological space,D be a nonempty set and
let Γ : F (D)→ 2X be a correspondence with nonempty values ΓA = Γ (A)
for A ∈ F (D). The family (X,D;Γ ) is called an abstract convex space.
Definition 2 [13]. For a nonempty subsetD′ ofD, we define the Γ -convex
hull of D′, denoted by coΓD
′, as
coΓD
′=∪{ΓA : A ∈ F (D
′)} ⊂ X.
Definition 3 [13]. Given an abstract convex space (X,D, Γ ), a nonempty
subset Y of X is called to be a Γ -convex subset of (X,D, Γ ) relative to D′
if for any A ∈ F (D′), we have ΓA ⊂ Y , that is, coΓD
′ ⊂ Y.
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Definition 4 [13]. When D ⊂ X in (X,D, Γ ), a subset Y of X is said to
be Γ -convex if coΓ (Y ∩D) ⊂ Y ; in other words, Y is Γ -convex relative to
D′ = Y ∩D. In case X = D, let (X,Γ ) = (X,X, Γ ).
Definition 5 [13]. The abstract convex space (X,D, Γ ) is called compact
if X is compact.
We have abstract convex subspaces as the following simple observation.
Proposition 1 For an abstract convex space (X,D, Γ ) and a nonempty
subset D′ of D, let Y be a Γ -convex subset of X relative to D′ and Γ ′ :
F (D′)→ 2Y a correspondence defined by
Γ ′A = ΓA ⊂ X for A ∈ F (D
′).
Then (Y,D′, Γ ′) itself is an abstract convex space called a subspace
relative to D′.
The following result is known.
Lemma 1 (12) Let (Xi, Di, Γi)i∈I be any family of abstract convex spaces.
Let X =
∏
i∈I Xi be equipped with the product topology and D =
∏
i∈I Di.
For each i ∈ I, let pii : D → Di be the projection. For each A ∈ F (D),
define Γ (A) =
∏
i∈I Γi(pii(A)). Then (X,D, Γ ) is an abstract convex space.
Definition 6 [13]. Let (X,D, Γ ) be an abstract convex space. Then F :
D → 2X is called a KKM correspondence if it satisfies ΓA ⊂ F (A) :=
∪y∈AF (y) for all A ∈ F (D).
Definition 7 [13]. The partial KKM principle for an abstract convex
space (X,D, Γ ) is the statement that, for any closed-valued KKM corre-
spondence F : D → 2X , the family {F (z)}z∈D has the finite intersection
property. The KKM principle is the statement that the same property also
holds for any open-valued KKM correspondence.
An abstract convex space is called a KKM space if it satisfies the KKM
principle.
Proposition 2 Let (X,D, Γ ) be an abstract convex space and (X,D′, Γ ′) a
subspace. If (X,D, Γ ) satisfies the partial KKM principle, then so does (X,
D′, Γ ′).
Let (X,D, Γ ) be an abstract convex space.
Definition 8 [13]. The function f : X → R is said to be quasiconcave
(resp. quasiconvex) if {x ∈ X : f(x) > r} (resp., {x ∈ X : f(x) < r} is
Γ -convex for each r ∈ R.
In [7], Luc and al. have introduced the concept of intersectionally closed-
valued correspondences.
Definition 9. Let F : D → 2X be a correspondence.
(i) [7] F is intersectionally closed-valued if ∩z∈DF (z) = ∩z∈DF (z);
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(ii) F is transfer closed-valued if ∩z∈DF (z) = ∩z∈DF (z);
(iii) [7] F is unionly open-valued if Int∪z∈DF (z) = ∪z∈DIntF (z);
(iv) F is transfer open-valued if ∪z∈DF (z) = ∪z∈DIntF (z);
Luc at al. [7] noted that (ii)⇒(i).
Proposition 3 (7) The correspondence F is intersectionally closed-valued
(resp. transfer closed-valued) if only if its complement FC is unionly open-
valued (resp. transfer open-valued).
Definition 10 [13]. LetY be a subset of X.
(i) Y is said to be intersectionally closed (resp. transfer closed) if there is
an intersectionally (resp., transfer) closed-valued correspondence F : D →
2X such that Y = F (z) for some z ∈ D.
(ii) Y is said to be unionly open (resp. transfer open) if there is an
unionly (resp., transfer) open-valued correspondence F : D → 2X such that
Y = F (z) for some z ∈ D.
S. Park gives in [13] the concept of generally lower (resp. upper) semi-
continuous function.
Definition 11 [13]. The function f : D ×X → R is said to be generally
lower (resp. upper) semicontinuous (g.l.s.c.) (resp. g.u.s.c.) on X whenever,
for each z ∈ D, {y ∈ X : f(z, y) ≤ r} (resp., {y ∈ X : f(z, y) ≥ r}) is
intersectionally closed for each r ∈ R.
The aim of this paper is to prove the existence of a weighted Nash
equilibrium for a multicriteria game defined in the framework of abstract
convex spaces. For our purpose, we need the following theorem (variant of
Theorem 6.3 in [13]).
Theorem 1 (Minimax inequality, [13]). Let (X,D = X,Γ ) an abstract con-
vex space satisfying the partial KKM principle, f, g : X ×X → R extended
real-valued functions and γ ∈ R such that
(i) for each x ∈ X, g(x, x) ≤ γ;
(ii) for each y ∈ X, F (y) = {x ∈ X : f(x, y) ≤ γ} is intersectionally
closed (respectiv, transfer closed);
(iii) for each x ∈ X, coΓ {y ∈ X : f(x, y) > γ} ⊂ {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > γ};
(iv) the correspondence F : X → 2X satisfies the following condition:
there exists a nonempty compact subset K of X such that either
(a) K ⊃ ∩{F (y) : y ∈M} for some M ∈ F (X); or
(b) for each N ∈ F (X), there exists a compact Γ -convex subset LN of
X relative to some X ′ ⊂ X such that N ⊂ X ′ and K ⊃ LN ∩∩y∈X′F (y) 6=
φ.
Then
1) there exists a x0 ∈ X (resp., x0 ∈ K) such that f(x0, y) ≤ γ for all
y ∈ X ;
2) if γ := supx∈X g(x, x), then we have
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inf x∈X supy∈X f(x, y) ≤ supx∈X g(x, x).
For the case when X = D (we are concerned with compact abstract
spaces (X,Γ ) satisfying the partial KKM principle), we have the following
variants of the corollaries stated in [13].
Corollary 1 (13) Let f, g : X×X → R be real-valued functions and γ ∈ R
such that
(i) for each x, y ∈ X, f(x, y) ≤ g(x, y) and g(x, x) ≤ γ;
(ii) for each y ∈ X, {x ∈ X : f(x, y) > γ} is unionly open in X;
(iii) for each x ∈ X, {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > γ} is Γ -convex on X ;
Then
1) there exists a x0 ∈ X such that f(x0, y) ≤ γ for all y ∈ X ;
2) if γ := supx∈X g(x, x), then we have
inf x∈X supy∈X f(x, y) ≤ supx∈X g(x, x).
Corollary 2 (13) Let f, g : X ×X → R be functions such that
(i) for each x, y ∈ X, f(x, y) ≤ g(x, y) and g(x, x) ≤ γ;
(ii) for each y ∈ X, f(·, y) is g.l.s.c on X;
(iii) for each x ∈ X, f(x, ·) is quasiconcave on X ;
Then we have
inf x∈X supy∈X f(x, y) ≤ supx∈X g(x, x).
3 MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES
Now we consider the multicriteria game (or multiobjective game) in its
strategic form. Let I be a finite set of players and for each i ∈ I, let Xi
be the set of strategies such that X =
∏
i∈I Xi and (Xi, Di, Γi for each
i ∈ I) is an abstract convex space with Di ⊂ Xi. Let T
i : X → 2R
ki
,
where ki ∈ N, which is called the payoff function (or called multicriteria).
From Lemma 1, we also have that (X,D, Γ ) is an abstract convex space,
where X =
∏
i∈I Xi, D =
∏
i∈I Di and Γ (A) =
∏
i∈I Γi(pii(A)) for each
A ∈ F (D).
Definition 12. The family G = ((Xi, Di, Γi), T
i)i∈I is called multicriteria
game.
If an action x := (x1, x2, ..., xn) is played, each player i is trying to find
his/her payoff function T i(x) := (T i1(x), ..., T
i
ki
(x)), which consists of non-
commensurable outcomes. We assume that each player is trying to minimize
his/her own payoff according with his/her preferences.
In order to introduce the equilibrium concepts of a multicriteria game,
we need several necessary notation.
Notation. We shall denote by
R
m
+ := {u = (u1, u2, ...um) ∈ R
m : uj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, 2, ...,m} and
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intRm+ := {u = (u1, u2, ...um) ∈ R
m : uj > 0 ∀j = 1, 2, ...,m}
the non-negative othant of Rm and respective the non-empty interior
of Rm+ with the topology induced in terms of convergence of vector with
respect to the Euclidian metric.
Notation. For each i ∈ I, denoteX−i :=
∏
j∈I\{i}Xj . If x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈
X, we denote x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xn) ∈ X−i. If xi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈
X−i, we shall use the notation (x−i, xi) = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ..., xn) =
x ∈ X.
Notation. For each u, v ∈ Rm, u · v denote the standard Euclidian inner
product.
Let x̂ = (x̂1, x̂2, ..., x̂n) ∈ X. Now we have the following definitions.
Definition 13. A strategy x̂i ∈ Xi of player i is said to be a Pareto
efficient strategy (resp., a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with respect to
x̂ ∈ X of the multiobjective game G = ((Xi, Di, Γi), T
i)i∈I if there is no
strategy xi ∈ Xi such that
T i(x̂)− T i(x̂−i, xi) ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} (resp., T
i(x̂)− T i(x̂−i, xi) ∈intR
ki
+ \{0}).
Remark 1 Each Pareto equilibrium is a weak Pareto equilibrium, but the
converse is not always true.
Definition 14. A strategy x̂ ∈ X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium (resp.,
a weak Pareto equilibrium) of the multiobjective gameG = ((Xi, Di, Γi), T
i)i∈I
if for each player i ∈ I, x̂i ∈ Xi is a Pareto efficient strategy (resp., a weak
Pareto efficient strategy) with respect to x̂.
Definition 15. A strategy x̂ ∈ X is said to be a weighted Nash equi-
librium with respect to the weighted vector W = (Wi)i∈I with Wi =
(Wi,1,Wi,2, ...,Wi,ki) ∈ R
ki
+ of the multiobjective gameG = ((Xi, Di, Γi), T
i)i∈I
if for each player i ∈ I, we have
(i) Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0};
(ii) Wi · T
i(x̂) ≤ Wi · T
i(x̂−i, xi), ∀xi ∈ Xi,where · denotes the inner
product in Rki .
Remark 2 In particular, ifWi ∈ R
ki
+ with
∑ki
j=1Wi,j = 1 for each i ∈ I, then
the strategy x̂ ∈ X is said to be a normalized weighted Nash equilibrium
with respect to W.
4 EXISTENCE OF WEIGHTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND
PARETO NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Now, as an application of Theorem 1, we have the following existence the-
orem of weighted Nash equilibria for multiobjective games.
Theorem 2 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (Xi, Di = Xi, Γi)i∈I be any
finite family of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X,Γ )
satisfies the partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W =
(W1,W2, ...,Wn) with Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
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(i) for each y ∈ X, F (y) = {x ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi·(T
i(x−i, xi)−T
i(x−i, yi)) ≤
0} is intersectionally closed (respectiv, transfer closed);
(ii) there exists g : X ×X → R extended real-valued function such that
for each x ∈ X, g(x, x) ≤ 0 and for each x ∈ X, coΓ {y ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi)− T
i(x−i, yi)) > 0} ⊂ {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > 0};
(iii) the correspondence F : X → 2X satisfies the following condition:
there exists a nonempty compact subset K of X such that either
(a) K ⊃ ∩{F (y) : y ∈M} for some M ∈ F (X); or
(b) for each N ∈ F (X), there exists a compact Γ -convex subset LN of
X relative to some X ′ ⊂ X such that N ⊂ X ′ and K ⊃ LN ∩∩y∈x′F (y) 6=
φ;
then there exists x̂ ∈ K such that x̂ is a weighted Nash equilibria of the
game G = ((Xi, Γi), T
i)i∈I with respect to W.
Proof. Define the function f : X × X → R by f(x, y) =
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi) − T
i(x−i, yi)), (x, y) ∈ X × X. By Theorem 1, we have that
infx∈X supy∈X f(x, y) ≤ supx∈X g(x, x) = 0. It follows that there exists an
x̂ ∈ K such that f(x̂, y) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ X. That is
∑n
i=1Wi · (T
i(x̂−i, x̂i)−
T i(x̂−i, yi) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ X. For any given i ∈ I and any given yi ∈ Xi,
let y = (x̂−i, yi). Then we have
Wi · (T
i(x̂−i, x̂i)− T
i(x̂−i, yi)) =
=
∑n
j=1Wj ·(T
j(x̂−i, x̂i)−T
i(x̂−i, yi))−
∑
j 6=iWj ·(T
j(x̂−i, x̂i)−T
i(x̂−i, yi))
=
∑n
j=1Wj · (T
j(x̂−i, x̂i)− T
i(x̂−i, yi)) ≤ 0.
Therefore, we haveWi · (T
i(x̂−i, x̂i)−T
i(x̂−i, yi)) ≤ 0 for each i ∈ I and
yi ∈ Xi, that is x̂ ∈ K is a weighted Nash equilibrium of the game G with
respect to W.
We obtain the following corollaries for the compact games when X = D.
Corollary 3 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (Xi, Γi)i∈I be any finite fam-
ily of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X,Γ ) satisfies the
partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn)
with Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
(i) there exists g : X ×X → R such that for each x, y ∈ X,
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi)− T
i(x−i, yi)) ≤ g(x, y) and g(x, x) ≤ 0;
(ii) for each y ∈ X, {x ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi · (T
i(x−i, xi)− T
i(x−i, yi)) > 0}
is unionly open in X;
(iii) for each x ∈ X, {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > 0} is Γ -convex on X ;
then there exists x̂ ∈ X such that x̂ is a weighted Nash equilibria of the
game G = ((Xi, Γi), T
i)i∈I with respect to W.
Corollary 4 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (Xi, Γi)i∈I be any finite fam-
ily of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X,Γ ) satisfies the
partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn)
with Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
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(i) there exists g : X ×X → R such that for each x, y ∈ X,
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi)− T
i(x−i, yi)) ≤ g(x, y);
(ii) for each fixed y ∈ X, the function x →
∑n
i=1Wi · (T
i(x−i, xi) −
T i(x−i, yi)) is g.l.s.c on X;
(iii) for each fixed x ∈ X, the function y →
∑n
i=1Wi · (T
i(x−i, xi) −
T i(x−i, yi)) is quasiconcave on X;
then there exists x̂ ∈ X such that x̂ is a weighted Nash equilibria of the
game G = ((Xi, Γi), T
i)i∈I with respect to W.
In order to prove an existence theorem of Pareto equilibria for multiob-
jective games, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (15) Each normalized weighted Nash equilibrium x̂ ∈ X with a
weight W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn) with Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} (resp., Wi ∈intR
ki
+ \{0})
and
∑ki
j=1Wi,j = 1 for each i ∈ I, for a multiobjective game G = (Xi, T
i)i∈I
is a weak Pareto equilibrium (resp. a Pareto equilibrium) of the game G.
Remark 3 The conclusion of Lemma2 still holds if x̂ ∈ X is a weighted
Nash equilibrium with a weight W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn), Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} for
i ∈ I(resp., Wi ∈intR
ki
+ \{0} for i ∈ I) of the game G.
Remark 4 A Pareto equilibrium of G is not necessarily a weighted Nash
equilibrium of the game G.
Theorem 3 Let I be a finite set of indices, let (Xi, Di = Xi, Γi)i∈I be any
finite family of abstract convex spaces such that the product space (X,Γ )
satisfies the partial KKM principle. If there is a weighted vector W =
(W1,W2, ...,Wn) with Wi ∈ R
ki
+ \{0} such that the followings are satisfied:
(i) for each y ∈ X, F (y) = {x ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi·(T
i(x−i, xi)−T
i(x−i, yi)) ≤
0} is intersectionally closed (respectiv, transfer closed);
(ii) there exists g : X ×X → R extended real-valued function such that
for each x ∈ X, g(x, x) ≤ 0 and for each x ∈ X, coΓ {y ∈ X :
∑n
i=1Wi ·
(T i(x−i, xi)− T
i(x−i, yi)) > 0} ⊂ {y ∈ X : g(x, y) > 0};
(iii) the correspondence F : X → 2X satisfies the following condition:
there exists a nonempty compact subset K of X such that either
(a) K ⊃ ∩{F (y) : y ∈M} for some M ∈ F (X); or
(b) for each N ∈ F (X), there exists a compact Γ -convex subset LN of
X relative to some X ′ ⊂ X such that N ⊂ X ′ and K ⊃ LN ∩∩y∈x′F (y) 6=
φ;
then there exists x̂ ∈ K such that x̂ is a weak Pareto equilibrium of the
game G = ((Xi, Di = Xi, Γi), T
i)i∈I . In addition, if W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn)
with Wi ∈intR
ki
+ \{0} for i ∈ I, then G has at least a Pareto equilibrium
point x̂ ∈ X.
Proof. By Theorem 2, G has at least weighted Nash equilibrium point
x̂ ∈ K with respect of the weighted vector W. Lemma 2 and Remark 3
shows that x̂ is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point of G, and a Pareto
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equilibrium point of G if W = (W1,W2, ...,Wn) with Wi ∈intR
ki
+ \{0} for
each i ∈ I.
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